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Anaphora and Discourse Semantics
Abstract
We argue in this paper that many common adverbial phrases generally taken to be discourse connectives
signalling discourse relations between adjacent discourse units are instead anaphors. We do this by (i)
demonstrating their behavioral similarity with more common anaphors (pronouns and definite NPs); (ii)
presenting a general framework for understanding anaphora into which they nicely fit; (iii) showing the
interpretational benefits of understanding discourse adverbials as anaphors; and (iv) sketching out a
lexicalised grammar that facilitates discourse interpretation as a product of compositional rules, anaphor
resolution and inference.
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Anaphora and Discourse Semantics
Bonnie Webber Matthew Stone
Edinburgh University Rutgers University
Aravind Joshi Alistair Knott
University of Pennsylvania University of Otago
We argue in this paper that many common adverbial phrases generally taken to be dis-
course connectives signalling discourse relations between adjacent discourse units are
instead anaphors. We do this by (i) demonstrating their behavioral similarity with more
common anaphors (pronouns and denite NPs); (ii) presenting a general framework for
understanding anaphora into which they nicely t; (iii) showing the interpretational ben-
ets of understanding discourse adverbials as anaphors; and (iv) sketching out a lexi-
calised grammar that facilitates discourse interpretation as a product of compositional
rules, anaphor resolution and inference.
Introduction
Several years ago, in an ACL workshop paper, Janyce Wiebe (1993) cited Example 1 to
question the adequacy of tree structures for discourse.
(1) a. The car was nally coming toward him.
b. He [Chee] nished his diagnostic tests,
c. feeling relief.
d. But then the car started to turn right.
The problem she noted was that the discourse connectives but and then appear to link
clause (1d) to two dierent things: \then" to clause (1b) { i.e., the car starting to turn
right being the next relevant event after Chee's nishing his tests { and \but" to a
combination of clauses (1a) and (1c) { i.e., the car turning right failing the expectation
of its continuing in the same direction and being the car that Chee is awaiting. (The
former link is commonly called a sequence relation, and the latter, a form of contrast.)
These relations are usually taken to be the basis for low-level discourse structure,
leading to something like Figure 1 for Example 1. This structure might seem advantageous
in allowing the semantics of the example to be computed directly by compositional rules
and defeasible inference. However, this structure is in fact a DAG { a directed acyclic
graph.1 Viewed syntactically, arbitrary DAGS are completely unconstrained systems.
They substantially complicate interpretive rules for discourse, in order for those rules to
account for the relative scope of unrelated operators and the contribution of syntactic
nodes with arbitrarily many parents.
While we are not committed to discourse structure being a tree (e.g. Figure 2 from
(Bateman, 1999)), we feel that the cost to discourse theory of moving to arbitrary DAGs
for discourse structure is too great to be taken lightly. So we want to suggest another
explanation for these and other examples of apparent complex and crossing dependencies
 Division of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, 2 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh UK EH8 9LW.
E-mail: bonnie.webber@ed.ac.uk
1 The structure in Figure 1 is labelled with the type of relation taken to hold and its \support" from
either a connective (\but") or adverbial (\then"). There are other possible structures for
Example 1, but all of them are DAGS, so our point still holds.
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Figure 1
Possible discourse structure for Example 1.
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succession manner
Figure 2
Simple multi-parent structure
in discourse: while structural connectives such as coordinating (e.g., \but") and subordi-
nating (e.g., \although") conjunctions do indeed signal discourse relations between (the
interpretation of) their conjuncts, discourse adverbials such as \then", \otherwise", and
\nevertheless" are instead simply anaphors, signalling a relation between the interpre-
tation of their matrix clause and the discourse context. We argue that understanding
discourse adverbials as anaphors accomplishes four important goals:
1. It recognises their behavioral similarity with the pronouns and denite noun
phrases (NPs) that are the \bread and butter" of previous work on anaphora
(Section 1).
2. It contributes substance to the view, expressed for example by Carter (1987)
that anaphora comprises more than just pronouns and denite NPs:
Anaphora is the special case of cohesion where the meaning (sense
and/or reference) of one item in a cohesive relationship (the anaphor)
is, in isolation, somehow vague and incomplete, and can only be
properly interpreted by considering the meanings of the other item(s)
in the relationship (the antecedent(s)). (Carter, 1987, page 33)
This is explored in Section 2.
3. It supports the direct computation of discourse semantics through
compositional rules and defeasible inference. This is a goal that researchers
have been struggling after for some time (Asher and Lascarides, 1999; Gardent,
1997; Kehler, 1995; Polanyi and van den Berg, 1996; Scha and Polanyi, 1988;
Schilder, 1997a; Schilder, 1997b; van den Berg, 1996), and that Wiebe
essentially recognises in her concern about the consequences for discourse
structure of examples such as (1). Enabling anaphor resolution to contribute to
meaning simplies the process of compositional semantics2 and directs
2 There is an analogous situation at the sentence level, where the relationship between syntactic
structure and compositional semantics is simplied by factoring away inter-sentential anaphoric
relations. Here the factorisation is so obvious that one does not even think about any other
possibility.
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attention to how the meaning of discourse adverbials supports and
complements other aspects of discourse semantics (Section 3).
4. It allows us to see more clearly how a lexicalised approach to the computation
of clausal syntax and semantics extends naturally to the computation of
discourse syntax and semantics, providing a single semantic matrix with which
to associate speaker intentions and other aspects of pragmatics. (Section 4)
The account we provide here is meant to be compatible with current approaches to
discourse semantics such as DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; van Eijck and Kamp, 1997) and
Dynamic Semantics (Stokhof and Groenendijk, 1999) and with more detailed analyses
of the meaning and use of individual discourse adverbials, such as (Jayez and Rossari,
1998a; Traugott, 1997): it provides what we believe to be a simpler and more coherent
account of how discourse meaning is computed, rather than an alternative account of
what that meaning is or what speaker intentions it is being used to achieve.
1 Discourse Adverbials as Anaphors
1.1 Discourse Adverbials do not behave like Structural Connectives
We take the building blocks of the most basic level of discourse structure to be explicit
structural connectives between adjacent discourse units (i.e., coordinating and subordi-
nating conjunctions, and \paired" conjunctions such as \not only ... but also", \on the
one hand ... on the other (hand)", etc.) and inferred relations between adjacent discourse
units (in the absense of an explicit structural connective). Here, adjacency is what triggers
the inference. Consider the following example:
(2) You shouldn't trust John. He never returns what he borrows.
Adjacency leads the hearer to hypothesize that the second clause is related to its left-
adjacent neighbor { and more specically, that a form of rhetorical relation holds between
the two. (We discuss this more in Section 4.) Our goal in this section is to convince the
reader that many discourse adverbials { including \then", \also", \otherwise", \never-
theless", \instead" { behave not like structural connectives, but instead like anaphors.
Structural connectives and discourse adverbials do have one thing in common: Like
verbs, they can both be seen as heading a predicate-argument construction; unlike verbs,
their arguments are independent clauses. For example, both the subordinate conjunction
\after" and the adverbial \then" (in its temporal sense) can be seen as binary predicates
(sequence or after) whose arguments are clausally-derived events.
But that is the only thing that discourse adverbials and structural connectives have
in common. As we have pointed out in earlier papers (Webber, Knott, and Joshi, 1999;
Webber et al., 1999a; Webber et al., 1999b), structural connectives have two relevant
properties: while they admit stretching of predicate-argument dependencies, they do
not tolerate their crossing. This is most obvious in the case of preposed subordinate
conjunctions (Example 3) or \paired" coordinate conjunctions (Example 4). With such
connectives, the initial predicate signals that its two arguments will follow.
(3) Although John is generous, he is hard to nd.
(4) On the one hand, Fred likes beans. On the other hand, he's allergic to them.
Like verbs, structural connectives allow the distance between the predicate and its argu-
ments to be \stretched" over embedded material, without loss of the dependency between
them. For the verb \like" and an object argument \apples", such stretching without loss
of dependency is illustrated in Example 5b.
(5) a. Apples John likes.
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(i) (ii)
a
b
d
contrast[one/other]
elaboration
comparison[not only/but also]a
b
d
elaboration
concession[although]
cc
condition[if]
Figure 3
Discourse structures associated with (i) Example 6 and (ii) Example 7.
b. Apples Bill thinks he heard Fred say John likes.
That this also happens with structural connectives and their arguments, is illustrated
in Example 6 (in which the rst clause of Example 3 is elaborated by another preposed
subordinate-main clause construction embedded within it) and Example 7 (in which the
rst conjunct of Example 4 is elaborated by another paired-conjunction construction em-
bedded within it). Possible discourse structures for these examples are given in Figure 3.
(6) a. Although John is very generous {
b. if you need some money,
c. you only have to ask him for it {
d. he's very hard to nd.
(7) a. On the one hand, Fred likes beans.
b. Not only does he eat them for dinner.
c. But he also eats them for breakfast and snacks.
d. On the other hand, he's allergic to them.
But, as already noted, another property of structural connectives is that they do not
admit crossing of predicate-argument dependencies. If we do this with Examples 6 and
7, we get
(8) a. Although John is very generous {
b. if you need some money {
c. he's very hard to nd {
d. you only have to ask him for it.
(9) a. On the one hand, Fred likes beans.
b. Not only does he eat them for dinner.
c. On the other hand, he's allergic to them.
d. But he also eats them for breakfast and snacks.
Possible discourse structures for these (impossible) discourses are given in Figure 4. Even
if the reader nds no problem with these crossed versions, they clearly do not mean the
same thing as their uncrossed counterparts: In (9), \but" now appears to link (9d) with
(9c), conveying that despite being allergic to beans, Fred eats them for breakfast and
snacks. And while this might be inferred from (7), it is certainly not conveyed directly.
As a consequence, we stipulate that structural connectives do not admit crossing of their
predicate-argument dependencies.
That is not all. Since we take the basic level of discourse structure to be a conse-
quence of (a) relations associated with explicit structural connectives and (b) relations
4
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a cb
concession[although] condition[if]
elaboration
a b
elaboration
contrast[one/other] comparison[not only...]
(i) (ii)
dcd
Figure 4
(Impossible) discourse structures that would have to be associated with Example 8 (i) and
with Example 9 (ii).
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a b dc
conseq[so] explanation[because]
seq[then]
contrast[but]
Figure 5
Example 10, with structural realisation of all dependencies
whose defeasible inference is triggered by adjacency, we stipulate that low-level discourse
structure itself does not admit crossing structural dependencies. (In this sense, discourse
structure may be truly simpler than sentence structure. To verify this, it might be use-
ful to carefully examine the discourse structure of languages such as Dutch that allow
crossing dependencies in sentence-level syntax. Initial cursory examination does not give
any evidence of crossing dependencies in Dutch discourse.)
If we now consider the corresponding properties of discourse adverbials, we see that
they do admit crossing of predicate-argument dependencies. Example 10 shows this
clearly. Clause 10(d) contains the discourse adverbial \then". For it to get is rst ar-
gument from (b) { i.e., the event that the discovery in (d) is \after", it must cross the
structural connection between clauses (c) and (d) associated \because". This crossing
dependency is illustrated in Figure 5.
(10) a. John loves Barolo.
b. So he ordered three cases of the '97.
c. But he had to cancel the order
d. because then he discovered he was broke.
But of course crossing dependencies are not unusual in discourse because anaphors
(e.g., pronouns and denite NPs) do it all the time, for example:
(11) Every mani tells every womanj hei meets that shej reminds himi of hisi mother.
This suggests that in Example 10, the relationship between \then" and the previous
discourse might usefully be taken to be anaphoric as well.
1.2 Discourse Adverbials do behave like Anaphors
There is additional evidence to suggest that \otherwise", \then" and other discourse
adverbials are anaphors. First, anaphors in the form of denite and demonstrative NPs
can take implicit material as arguments. For example, in
(12) Stack ve blocks on top of one another. Now close your eyes and try knocking
fthe tower, this towerg over with your nose.
both NPs refer to the structure which is the implicit result of the block stacking. (Fur-
ther discussion of such examples can be found in (Isard, 1975; Dale, 1992; Webber and
Baldwin, 1992).) The same is true of discourse adverbials. In
(13) Do you want an apple? Otherwise you can have a pear.
the situation in which you can have a pear is one in which you don't want an apple { i.e.,
where your answer to the question is \no". But this answer isn't there structurally: it is
only inferred. While it appears natural to resolve an anaphor to an inferred entity, it would
be much more diÆcult to establish such links through purely structural connections: to do
so would involve a substantial commitment to covert constituents in discourse structure.
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Secondly, attempts to paraphrase \otherwise" in terms of the structural connective
\or" demonstrate that \otherwise" has a wider range of options.3 This is illustrated by
the following pair of examples:
(14) a. If the light is red, stop. Otherwise you'll get a ticket.
(If you do something other than stop, you'll get a ticket.)
b. If the light is red, stop. Otherwise go straight on.
(If the light is not red, go straight on.)
Only one of these two ways of resolving \otherwise" in the context of a preceding if-
construction can be paraphrased with \or" { that is, only the case where \otherwise"
resolves to an alternative to the consequence clause, as in (14a) { cf.
If the light is red, stop or you'll get a ticket.
Paraphrasing (14b) with \or", as in
If the light is red, stop or go straight on.
produces something whose meaning is quite dierent. Thus, \otherwise" has access to
material that is not available to a structural connective. (Actually, in Section 4, we posit
two separate lexico-syntactic entries for \or" as a structural connective { one for purely
logical \or" and the other for \or" conveying an independent semantic relation between
its arguments, as is the case here.)
Our nal piece of evidence is that, like pronouns, these discourse adverbials can
appear in an analogue of donkey sentences. Donkey sentences such as Example 15 have
been used to argue the intrinsic discourse nature of pronominal anaphors: that pronouns
are not merely a reex of a syntactic binding operation.
(15) Every farmer who owns a donkey feeds it rutabagas.
In donkey sentences, anaphors appear in a structural and interpretive environment in
which a direct syntactic relationship between anaphor and antecedent is normally impos-
sible. Therefore, donkey sentences are evidence for interpreting an anaphor by accessing
a discourse entity instead of by syntactic binding.
While no one has ever argued that discourse adverbials are a reex of a syntactic
binding operation { they have always been treated as elements of discourse interpretation,
signalling relations between adjacent clauses { it is signicant that they can appear in
their own version of donkey sentences, as in
(16) a. Anyone who has developed network software, has then had to hire a laywer
to protect his/her interests. (i.e., after developing network software)
b. Many people who have developed network software, have nevertheless never
gotten very rich. (i.e., despite having developed network software)
c. Every person selling \The Big Issue" might otherwise be asking for spare
change. (i.e., if s/he weren't selling \The Big Issue")
This suggests that discourse adverbials are accessing discourse entities (in particular,
eventualities) rather than signalling a structural connection between adjacent clauses.4
3 This was pointed out independently by Natalia Modjeska, Lauri Karttunen, Mark Steedman, Robin
Cooper and David Traum, on presentation of this work at ESSLLI'01 in Helsinki, August 2001.
4 While Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (Mann and Thompson, 1988) was developed as an
account of the relation between adjacent units within a text, Marcu's guide to RST annotation
(Marcu, 1999) has added an \embedded" version of each RST relation in order to hand examples
such as in (16c) and others, in which the material in an embedded clause (here, a relative clause)
bears a semantic relation to its matrix clause. While this importantly recognises the phenomenon, it
does not contribute to understanding its nature.
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These arguments have been directed at the behavioral similarity between discourse
adverbials and what we normally take to be discourse anaphors. But this isn't the only
reason to recognise them as anaphors: In the next section, we suggest a framework for
anaphora in which discourse adverbials t as neatly5 as pronouns and denite NPs.
2 A Framework for Anaphora
2.1 Discourse referents and anaphor interpretation
If we want to take discourse adverbials to be anaphors, we have to ask what kind, since
on the surface, adverbials neither walk nor talk like the anaphors we are must familiar
with { pronouns and denite NPs. All discourse anaphors involve, at the very least, an
anaphoric expression  and one or more entities er from the discourse context or context
of utterance6 that contribute in some way to the interpretation of , e.
One thing we want to point out, although it is not critical to our discussion of
discourse adverbials as anaphors, is that not all the material in the expression  may be
anaphoric { i.e., interpreted with respect to er. For example, one type of expression that
we take to be anaphoric is \other NPs"7, as in:
(17) a. The new mayor of London has declared war on pigeons.
b1. Other birds have not incurred his wrath.
b2. Other birds that inhabit the city year round have not incurred his wrath.
b3. Other birds with more sanitary habits have not incurred his wrath.
b4. Other more sanitary birds have not incurred his wrath.
In (b1), one would obviously take the anaphoric expression to be the entire NP \other
birds". Its interpretation involves the entity er evoked by \pigeons" in (17a), which is
excluded from the set of birds under consideration, which have not (we are told) incurred
the mayor's wrath. Similarly, in (b2), one would take the anaphoric expression to be the
entire NP \other birds that inhabit the city year round", with its interpretation involving
the exclusion of er (pigeons) from that set. In (b3) and (b4), however, if we take the
anaphoric expression to be the entire NP, then it is not the case that er (pigeons) is to
be excluded from the set of birds with more sanitary habits (b3) or more sanitary birds
(b4), since they don't belong to either set: they are simply being excluded from the set
of birds. So one may want to allow for an anaphoric expression to comprise only part of a
constituent, though the interpretation of the entire constituent will, as a result, depend
on how the anaphor is resolved.8
Now, besides er (the entity or entities from contextd=u) and e (the interpretation of
the anaphoric expression ), we have been motivated to introduce a third entity ei into
the process of anaphor interpretation, which we call a contextual parameter: ei is derived
from er and supplied to the interpretation of . The motivation relates to the familiar
phenomenon variously called textual ellipsis (Hahn, Markert, and Strube, 1996), partial
anaphora (Luperfoy, 1992), indirect anaphora (Hellman and Fraurud, 1996), associative
anaphora (Cosse, 1996), and bridging anaphora (Not, Tovena, and Zancanaro, 1999),
illustrated in Example 18.
(18) Myra darted to a phone and picked up the receiver.
5 to the extent that anything in human language can be considered \neat"
6 Since we refer to this disjunction so often, we abbreviate it simply contextd=u
7 There is more discussion of \other NPs" later in this section.
8 That this occurs even with denite NPs was observed over twenty years ago by one of the
co-authors (Joshi, 1978), who considered the question of whether a denite NP could
simultaneously co-refer and provide new information about its referent.
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Here, the receiver is taken to be the one associated with the phone Myra darted to.
Examples such as this can be modelled with the two entities we already have, by saying
that e can be derived from er by association. However, related examples such as
(19) She lifted the receiver as Myra darted to the other phone ....
discovered by Modjeska (2001) in the British National Corpus, require more, since the
anaphoric expression  (the other phone) is interpreted as the (contextually relevant)
phone that is not the one associated with the receiver that has just be lifted. That is,
getting from er to e in this case requires both association (as in Example 18) and
exclusion from a contextually relevant set.
We can deal with this by introducing another entity { a contextual parameter { and
computing e in two steps:
1. er ! ei (e.g., [receiver] ! [phone(er)])
2. ei ! e (e.g., [phone(er)] ! [fcontextually relevant phonesg - fphone(er)g]).
That is, in Example 19, \the receiver" evokes a discourse entity er that is a receiver;
from er, we derive ei, the phone associated with it; and from ei, we compute e, the
interpretation of \the other phone" is the phone in contextd=u that is not ei.
More generally, we distinguish possible relationships between er and ei and between
ei and e as follows:
 ei may be identical to er or some associate of er. This dierence between
coreference and mediated reference is a property of occurrences of
anaphors. That is, except for demonstrative NPs, which cannot be used for
mediated reference, the same type of anaphoric expression can be used for
both.
 e may be identical to ei or computed from ei in some more complex way that
is idiosyncratic to the particular anaphor. This dierence between an
interpretation that is specified by the contextual parameter and one that is
computed from it, is a property of the type of anaphoric expression.
These possible relations between er and ei and between ei and e give us the familiar
case of coreference when e = ei = er. This is shown in Examples 20{23, using a variety
of anaphoric expressions:
(20) pronoun: The terrier down the block bit me yesterday. It's a vicious little beast.
(21) denite NP: John used to have both a terrier and a schnauzer. However, one
day the terrier got loose and ran away.
(22) demonstrative pronoun: The terrier down the block bit me yesterday. My
sister found this amusing.
(23) demonstrative NP: Some of the women in the ward are over 30. If any of these
primagravidae requests a nurse, please attend to them right away.
Example 22 also illustrates identity with the discourse entity associated with an even-
tuality, while Example 23 illustrates our earlier point that not all the material in an
anaphoric expression may be anaphoric, with \primagravidae" (applied to women over
30 who are giving birth for the rst time) being new information provided about the
entity that the demonstrative NP co-refers to.9
9 Accounting for how coreference is resolved is probably the most persistent topic in the literature on
anaphora, both from a psycholinguistic and from an engineering perspective. However, it is not one
we will address in this paper, though it is relevant to all forms of anaphora we discuss here.
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Distinguishing the relation between er and ei from that between ei and e also gives
the familiar case of associative reference (aka \textual ellipsis", \partial anaphora", \in-
direct anaphora", \associative anaphora" and \bridging anaphora") when ei = assoc(er),
and either e = ei or e  ei. This is shown in Examples 24{26. The only constraint is
that the association be licensed by the domain. (Notice that in the case of (24) and
(26), e=ei (i.e., the interpretation is specified by the contextual parameter), while in
(25), e is an element of ei (i.e., the interpretation is computed from the contextual
parameter).10
(24) denite NP: John forgot to put the picnic supplies in his cooler. So when he
got to the picnic, the beer was too warm to drink.
er = [picnic supplies]
e = ei = [beer(ei)]
(25) indenite NP: The Number 26 bus had to detour to the Western General be-
cause a passenger fell unconscious.
er = [the Number 26 bus]
ei = passengers(er)
e  ei
(26) demonstrative pronoun: Multiply 14 times 51, and then divide that by 17.
er = [act of multiplying 14*51]
e = ei = [result(er)]
But e may also be computed from ei in ways that are idiosyncratic to the particular
anaphor, where either ei = er or ei = assoc(er). Anaphors of this type we call lexical
anaphors. Some are referring expressions: The most common may be NPs of the form
\(the) other X", which refer to the result of excluding ei from a contextually-relevant set
(Bierner, 2001a; Bierner, 2001b; Bierner and Webber, 2000; Modjeska, 2001). Here, ei
may be an individual (Example 27) or a set derived from a plural NP or through \split
reference" (Example 28).
(27) Q: What's the drinking age in Afganistan?
A: : : :
Q: What's it in other countries?
ei = er = [Afganistan]
e = fcountriesg - feig
(28) Q: What's the drinking age in Afganistan?
A: : : :
Q: What's it in Bolivia?
A: : : :
Q: What's it in other countries?
ei = er = f[Afganistan], [Bolivia]g
e = fcountriesg - ei
As we have already seen in Example 19 (repeated here), the contextual parameter
may be associated with er (mediated reference), rather than identical with it:
(19) She lifted the receiver as Myra darted to the other phone ....
er = [receiver]
ei = [phone(er)]
e = [fcontextually relevant phonesg - feig]
10 Again here, the main problem noted in the literature is that of specifying eective resolution
procedures that take advantage of both the contextd=u and world knowledge { the latter to
characterise licenced associations.
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What is to be excluded can also come from the context of utterance, as in Example 29,
asked by or of the rst author,
(29) Are there other short people working on discourse?
ei = er = [BLW]
e = fshort people working on discourseg - feig
or the excluded entity may be an eventuality associated with one or more clauses, as in
the following from (Modjeska, 2001):
(30) If the patient is very heavy or the carer cannot manage for some other reason
: : : [BNC]
ei = er = kthe patient is very heavyk
e = freasons why the carer cannot manageg - feig
Note that \other X" also presupposes that the excluded entities belong to the set
under consideration (Bierner and Webber, 2000; Bierner, 2001a; Bierner, 2001b). For
example, in (31), \other rug-making countries" presupposes that China is a rug-making
country, and \other artistic disciplines" presupposes that rug-making is an artistic dis-
cipline.
(31) Unlike other rug-making countries, China mainly draws its design repertoire from
other artistic disciplines (painting, etc), : : :
ei1 = er1 = [China]
e1 = frug-making countriesg - fei1g
presupposed: er1  frug-making countriesg
ei2 = er2 = [rug-making]
e2 = fartistic disciplinesg - fei2g
presupposed: er2  fartistic disciplinesg
A hearer for whom this is new information must either accommodate it or refuse to
do so. Certain relational anaphors such as \nevertheless" also have a presuppositional
component to their meaning (Section 2.2). This will be relevant to our discussion in
Section 3 of relations between the semantic contributions of anaphoric connectives and
those of structural connectives and adjacency-triggered inferences.
Other expressions discussed in (Bierner, 2001b) that incorporate in an idiosyncratic
way, an individual or set from the discourse context or context of utterance are noun
phrases headed by \other" (Example 32), \such NPs" (Example 33), comparative NPs
(Example 34), and the pronoun \elsewhere" (Example 35).
(32) Some dogs are constantly on the move. Others lie around until you call them.
(33) I saw a 2kg lobster in the sh store yesterday. The shmonger said it takes about
5 years to grow to such a size.
(34) Terriers are very nervous. Larger dogs tend to have calmer dispositions.
(35) I don't like sitting in this room. Can we move elsewhere?
As Bierner (2001b) notes, these have similar presuppositions about membership of ei in
the set under consideration. In addition, all of them also appear in constructions that are
not anaphoric { e.g., Xs other than Y, Xs such as Y, <comparative> Xs than Y, etc.,
where what is to be excluded or compared to is provided structurally. But ignoring these
non-anaphoric versions, the same problem of how to resolve lexical function anaphors
against the discourse context or context of utterance remains to be solved (Modjeska,
2001; Salmon-Alt, 2000).11
11 Our discussion here of relations between er, ei and e focusses on referring expressions and
11
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2.2 Discourse Adverbials as Lexical Anaphors
We want to claim that lexical anaphors do not have to be referring expressions. Instead, a
lexical anaphor can express a binary relation between an anaphorically-derived argument
(the contextual parameter ei) and the interpretation of the anaphor's matrix sentence or
clause. The result is an additional proposition contributed to the discourse.
This is the way in which we claim that a variety of discourse adverbials are anaphoric
{ for example, \then" in Example 36 and \instead" in Example 37.12
(36) John loves Barolo. So he ordered three cases of the '97. But he had to cancel the
order because he then discovered he was broke. (i.e., after he ordered the wine,
he discovered he was broke.)
(37) John didn't have enough money to buy a mango. Instead, he bought a guava.
(i.e., he bought a guava as an alternative to buying a mango)
These paraphrases are only meant to convey rough approximations of the actual mean-
ing of \then" and \instead". Our concern here is only with the mechanism by which
these adverbials get their meaning. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of discourse
adverbials and connectives, see (Jayez and Rossari, 1998a; Jayez and Rossari, 1998b;
Lagerwerf, 1998; Traugott, 1995; Traugott, 1997) and others.
Formally, we model such lexical anaphors { which we call relational anaphors { as a
function that maps the contextual parameter ei (either coreferential with er or associated
with it) to an expression that is idiosyncratic to the anaphor
 : ei ! x:R(x; ei)
That function then applies to the eventuality  that corresponds to the interpretation of
the anaphor's matrix clause S, yielding a proposition
S : [x:R(x; ei)] = R(; ei)
The two dierent function notations (!, ) and the explicit step of derivation here
indicate that the contextual parameter ei serves as an argument to R but that  is
supplied compositionally from syntax.
We will now use this to explain what is going on in a range of examples involving
discourse adverbials. But to do so, we need to introduce and justify the representation
we will use for clausal interpretations.
There are two common ways of representing predicate-argument relations in sentence-
level interpretations. For example, the meaning of Example 38a can be roughly repre-
sented either as (b) or (c).
(38) a. John likes some apples.
b. likes'(e,j,a) ^ john'(j) ^ some-apples'(a)
c. likes'(john', some-apples')
discourse adverbials. But other linguistic phenomena have been considered anaphoric, including VP
ellipsis (Hardt, 1999; Kehler, 1995), \do so" anaphora (and, we suggest, \do otherwise"). Certain
modiers might also be considered anaphors (e.g., \dierent", \dierently", \similar", \similarly",
etc.). So it would be worthwhile to consider what, if anything, can be gained by analysing such
anaphors in terms of these two stages of er ! ei and ei ! e.
12 Words and phrases that function as discourse adverbials may have other functions as well { e.g.,
\otherwise" can be used as an adjectival modier, as in \I was otherwise occupied with grading
exams." and \on the other hand" may serve as one half of the structural connective \On the one
hand, : : : On the other (hand), : : : " (cf. Section 4). Overloading closed-class lexico-syntactic items
is not unusual in English, and must just be handled as part of the normal ambiguity resolution
process.
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(38b) makes explicit the role of individuals, eventualities and relationships among them in
interpretation. It helps the reader understand the kind of meanings that lexical items can
have, or the way lexical meanings contribute to utterance meaning. But representations
like (38b) are less general than representations like (38c), as Example 39 illustrates.
(39) a. The president opposes tax increases.
b. oppose'(e,p,i) ^ president'(p) ^ taxincreases'(i)
c. oppose'(president', taxincreases')
We can easily understand (39a) as a compact description of many dierent people
(Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush) fullling a common role over time, and the attitudes
they have taken to a number of purely hypothetical objects (planned increases that
were never realized). Representations like (39b) accommodate this only by some rather
extreme assumptions about what individuals and eventualities can count as values for e,
p or i. Representations like (38c) and (39c) are more general, while aording less specic
semantic intuitions.
We nd the same tradeo with predicate-argument structures in discourse. (For
ease of reading later on, we will switch here to a minor syntactic variant of the \b"
representation, in which the eventuality argument indexes the predicate { for example,
e:likes(j,a) rather than likes(e,j,a).)
(40) a. John left because Mary left.
b. e1:left'(j) ^ john'(j) ^ e2:left'(m) ^ mary'(m) ^ e3:because(e1,e2)
c. because'(left'(john'),left'(mary')
While (40b) gives good intuitions about the individuals and eventualities described
in discourse and the compositionality involved in discourse interpretation, representing
\because" this way requires understanding eventualities in a rich and potentially prob-
lematic way. On the other hand, while (40c) is unproblematic, its notation does not help
us remember the many constraints on \because" { in particular, that John and Mary did
in fact leave!
Anaphora and anaphor resolution complicate the picture: The b-representations rep-
resent resolved anaphors by reuse of a discourse referent, while the c-representations
require the construction of E-type descriptions (Evans, 1980; Neale, 1990) that draw on
material from previous discourse. We can see this by continuing Example 38 as follows:
(41) a. : : : [but] Bill hates them.
b. : : : e2:hates'(b,a) ^ bill'(b)
c. hates'(bill', the'(apples',  x . likes'(john',x)))
(41b) reuses the discourse referent a introduced by \some apples" in (38b). For (38c),
there is no such discourse referent, so we have to construct a description: \the apples
John likes".
In this paper, we follow Hobbs (1985) in using b-style representations, because we
want to make intuitions about individuals, eventualities, lexical meaning and anaphora as
clear as possible. But this choice is not theoretically necessary. Using this representation,
we treat our familar Example 10, repeated here as (42), as follows:
(42) John loves Barolo. So he ordered three cases of the '97. But he had to cancel the
order because he then discovered he was broke.
then: ei !  x . after(x, ei)
S = he [John] discovered he was broke
 = e4, where e4:discover(j, e5) and e5:broke(j)
ei = er = e2, where e2:order(j, c1)
then S: [ x . after(x, e2)]e4  after(e4, e2)
That is, e4 (the interpretation of S as an eventuality) is the event of John discovering
that he was broke, while e2 is the event of John ordering three cases of the '97 Barolo.
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Resolving the anaphor \then" to e2 leads to the proposition after(e4, e2) being added to
the discourse context.
Similarly, in Example 43, \then" picks up a culminated event from the discourse
context and maps it to an expression that applies to the interpretation of its matrix
sentence, adding a proposition to the discourse context.
(43) Go west on Lancaster Avenue. Then turn right on County Line.
then: ei !  x . after(x, ei)
S = turn right on County Line
 = e3, where e3:turn-right(you, cl)
er = e1, where e1:go-west(you, la)
ei = e2, where e2:culmination(er)
then S: [ x . after(x, e2)]e3  after(e3, e2)
That is, e3 is the event of the hearer (h) turning right on County Line (cl), which is the
interpretation of S as an eventuality, while er resolves to e1, the event of the hearer go-
ing west on Lancaster Avenue. But since \then" requires a culminated eventuality as its
second argument, ei is its associated culmination, e2. But of course, the intended culmina-
tion is not the end of Lancaster Avenue (about 75 miles west of downtown Philadelphia),
but its intersection with County Line (about 4 miles west of downtown). This must be
derived through further inference that we do not discuss here. Finally, resolving \then"
leads to the proposition after(e3, e2) being added to the discourse context.
It is important to stress here that the level of representation we are concerned with
is essentially a logical form (LF) for discourse { propositions of the form after(e3, e2)
and if(e4, e5). Any reasoning that might then have to be done on their content might
then require making explicit the dierent modal and temporal contexts involved, their
accessibility relations, etc. But as our goal here is primarily to capture the mechanism in
which discourse adverbials are involved in discourse structure and discourse semantics,
we will continue to assume for as long as possible that a LF representation will suÆce.
Now it may appear as if there is no dierence between treating adverbials as anaphors
and treating them as structural connectives { that is, as evidence for relations between
adjacent discourse units. However, we claim that a relation conveyed by an anaphor
can be distinct from any relation associated with structure. In fact, we will demonstrate
in Section 3 a variety of ways in which discourse adverbials can interact with inferred
relations and explicit structural relations.
One particular relational anaphor { \otherwise" { that we discussed previously in
(Webber et al., 1999a) deserves more comment here. Roughly speaking, \otherwise" con-
veys that the complement of its anaphorically-derived contextual parameter ei serves as a
condition under which the interpretation of its structural matrix holds. (This complement
must be with respect to some contextually relevant set.13)
13 Kruij-Korbayova and Webber (2001) demonstrate that the Information Structure of sentences in
the previous discourse (theme-rheme partitioning, as well as focus within theme and within rheme
(Steedman, 2000a)) can inuence what eventualities er, and thus what contextual parameters ei,
are available for resolving the anaphorically derived argument of \otherwise". This then correctly
predicts dierent interpretations for \otherwise" in (i) and (ii):
(i) Q: How should I transport the dog?
A: You should carry the dog. Otherwise you might get hurt.
(ii) Q. What should I carry?
A. You should carry the dog. Otherwise you might get hurt.
In both (i) and (ii), the questions constrain the theme/rheme partition of the answer, while small
capitals convey focus within the rheme. In (i), the \otherwise" clause will be interpreted as warning
the hearer (H) that H might get hurt if s/he transports the dog in some way other than carrying it
(e.g., H might get tangled up in its lead). In (ii), the \otherwise" clause warns H that s/he might
14
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If we represent a conditional relational between two eventualities simply as if(e1,e2),
where e1 is the antecedent and e2, the consequent, and we approximate the contextu-
ally relevant alternatives e2 to an eventuality e1 using a complement predicte { e.g.,
complement(e1; e2) { then we can represent the interpretation of \otherwise" as
otherwise: ei !  x . if(egi, x), where complement(ei; egi)
and index gi is heretofore unused. That is, \otherwise" presupposes a contextually rel-
evant complement to ei and asserts that if any member of that complement holds, the
argment to the -expression will. The resulting -expression applies to the interpreta-
tion of the matrix clause of \otherwise", resulting in the both the complement and the
conditional being added to the discourse context:
otherwise S: [ x . if(egi, x)] , where complement(ei, egi)
 if(egi, ), where complement(ei, egi)
As we showed in Section 1.2, dierent ways of resolving the anaphoric argument lead
to dierent interpretations:
(44) If the light is red, stop. Otherwise you'll get a ticket.
otherwise: ei !  x . if(egi, x), where complement(ei; egi)
S = you get a ticket
 = e3, where e3:get ticket(you)
ei = er = e2, where e2:stop(you)
otherwise S: if(egi, e3), where complement(e2, egi)
i.e., If you do something other than stop, you'll get a ticket.
(45) If the light is red, stop. Otherwise go straight on.
otherwise: ei !  x . if(egi, x), where complement(ei; egi)
S = go straight on
 = e3, where e3:go straight(you)
ei = er = e2, where e2:red(light1)
otherwise S: if(egi, e3), where complement(e2, egi)
i.e., if the light is not red, go straight on.
Like plural pronouns, denite NPs and \other NPs" (cf. Example 28), \otherwise" too can
exploit \split antecedents", which are then excluded from the context of interpretation
of the matrix clause, as in:
(46) If the light is red, you should stop.
If it's ashing yellow, you should slow down.
Otherwise you can continue on your way.
Here, the light being red and it being yellow are both excluded from the contextually
relevant situations (i.e., ones related to the state of the light).
And as already noted (Section 1.2), limited forms of inference may also be required
to resolve \otherwise" and other relational anaphors, as in:
(47) Do you want an apple? Otherwise you can have a pear.
Here the situations in which you can have a pear are ones alternative to those in which
you want an apple { i.e., in which the answer to the question is \yes".
get hurt if what she is carrying is not the dog (e.g., H might be walking past fanatical members of
the Royal Kennel Club).
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To close, we want to point to a nal type of lexical anaphor which contributes to
the discourse context neither an entity (by virtue of being a referring expression) nor a
proposition (as above). Instead, its idiosyncratic contribution to the discourse context has
the form of a rule { the same kind of presupposed defeasible rule (PDR) that Lagerwerf
(1998) in his PhD dissertation attributes to the semantics of the structural connectives
\although" and \but" { a rule whose applicability is denied in the current case.14 This
is the contribution of the discourse adverbials \nevertheless" and \though"
Stretching our previous notation somewhat, we can represent the defeasible rule they
contribute to the discourse as
nevertheless: ei ! x : ei > :x
Applying this to the interpretation  of the matrix clause of the adverbial yields
nevertheless S: [x : ei > :x]  ei > :
where > is Asher & Morreau's commonsense entailment operator (1991). (That is, nor-
mally if the anaphorically derived situation holds,  doesn't.) For example,
(48) John graduated with honors. Nevertheless he was depressed.
S = John was depressed
 = e2, where e2:depressed(john)
ei = er = e1, where e1:graduate cum laude(john)
nevertheless S: [x : e1 > :x]e2  e1 > :e2
i.e., Normally if John graduates with honors, he is not depressed. This rule is then de-
nied by the matrix clause { he was depressed. While we recognize that the defeasible
rule that is accommodated (or conventionally implicated) here is more likely to involve
generalisations of both ei and  { something like \normally if someone graduates with
honors, they are not depressed", rather than something particular to John { the process
of abstracting to an appropriate level seems separable from that of resolving the anaphor
and formulating the rule whose applicability is being denied.
2.3 Summary
The general framework we have presented for anaphora has two main features:
 It posits a third entity ei { a contextual parameter { involved in the resolution
process, in order to allow all types of anaphora to make use of the step from a
discourse referent to one associated with it, and then a subsequent step that
may simply be equivalence or something idiosyncratic to the type of anaphor.
 It allows anaphors to use ei in idiosyncratic ways that may lead, not only to
new referring expressions (and thus new entities), but also to additional
propositions and presuppositions in the discourse context.
We have shown er and ei being used systematically in a variety of ways in computing
the interpretation e of anaphoric expressions , and have thereby enlarged the range of
expressions usefully thought of as anaphoric.
14 Earlier, both George Lako (1971a) and Robin Lako (1971b) called attention to such a
presupposition.
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3 Inferred, Structural and Anaphoric Relations
Prior to the current work, accounts have treated both explicit structural connectives
(coordinating and subordinating conjunctions, and \paired" conjunctions) and discourse
adverbials simply as evidence for a particular structural relation holding between adjacent
units. For example, Kehler (1995) takes \but" as evidence of a contrast relation between
adjacent units, \in general" as evidence of a generalization relation, \in other words" as
evidence of a elaboration relation, \therefore" as evidence of a result relation, \because" as
evidence of a explanation relation, and \even though" as evidence of a denial of preventer
relation (Kehler, 1995, Chapter 2.1), and Marcu (1999), following Mann and Thompson
(1988), appears to take \otherwise" as evidence for an otherwise relation.
Because we take discourse adverbials to contribute meaning in a dierent way than
explicit structural connectives, we predict that they can interact in a variety of ways with
relations conveyed structurally and inferred relations triggered by adjacency. Below we
show that this prediction is correct.
We start from the idea that { in the absence of an explicit structural connective {
defeasible inference correlates with structural attachment of adjacent discourse segments
in discourse structure, relating their interpretations. The most basic relation is that the
following segment in some way describes the same generalised object or eventuality as
the one it abuts (elaboration). But evidence in the segments can lead (via defeasible in-
ference) to a more specic relation, such as one of the resemblence relations (e.g., parallel,
contrast, exemplication, generalisation), or cause-eect relations (result, explanation, vi-
olated expectation), or contiguity relations (narration) described in (Hobbs, 1990; Kehler,
1995). If nothing more specic can be inferred, the relation will remain simply elabora-
tion. What explicit structural connectives can do is convey relations that are not easy to
convey by defeasible inference (e.g., \if", conveying condition, and \or", conveying dis-
junction) or provide non-defeasible evidence for an inferrable relation (e.g., \yet", \so"
and \because").
This is not, we claim, what discourse adverbials do. Rather, they interact in a variety
of ways with structural connectives, with adjacency-triggered defeasible inference and
with each other. This section describes the kinds of interactions we have observed so far,
using the same notation used in the previous section:
  = discourse adverbial;
 S = the matrix clause/sentence of ;
  = the logical form (LF) interpretation of S;
 ei = the contextual parameter supplied to the interpretation of ;
R = the name of the relation associated with .
But because we will be considering how the relation between discourse-adjacent units
can interact with the interpretation of a discourse adverbial, we need some additional
notation as well.
D = the immediately left-adjacent discourse unit that S relates to via an
adjacency-triggered inference or an explicit structural connective;
 Æ = the LF interpretation of D;
R = the name of the relation between  and Æ;
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Case 1: R(; ei) is distinct from R(; Æ) because ei 6= Æ .
As before, we start with our familiar Example 10, repeated earlier as (42) and here
as (49):
(49) John loves Barolo. So he ordered three cases of the '97. But he had to cancel the
order because he then discovered he was broke.
then: ei !  x . after(x, ei)
S = he [John] discovered he was broke
 = e4, where e4:discover(j, e5)
D = he [John] had to cancel the order
Æ = e3, where e3:cancel(j, o1)
R(; Æ)  explanation(e4, e3)
ei = er = e2, where e2:order(j, c1)
R(; ei)  [ x . after(x, e2)]e4  after(e4, e2)
That is, after relates the discovery (e4) to the ordering (e2), while explanation (conveyed
by \because") relates it to the cancelling (e3).
15
Case 2: R incorporates R(; ei) as one argument. When the anaphor \otherwise"
is resolved, the resulting conditional relation serves as one argument to R, and Æ serves as
the other. This holds whetherR is conveyed structurally (cf. Example 50a with \because",
Example 51a with \but") or a by adjacency-triggered inference, as shown in the parallel
\b" examples, repeated here from (44) and (45).
(50) a. If the light is red, stop, because otherwise you'll get a ticket.
b. If the light is red, stop. Otherwise you'll get a ticket.
otherwise: ei !  . if(egi, x)], where complement(ei; egi)
S = you get a ticket
 = e3, where e3:get ticket(you)
D = stop
Æ = e2, where e2:stop(you)
ei = er = e2, where e2:stop(you)
R(; ei)  e4: if(egi; e3), where complement(e2; egi)
R(; Æ)  explanation(e4, e2)
i.e., If you do something other than stop, you'll get a ticket.
(51) a. If the light is red, stop, but otherwise go straight on.
b. If the light is red, stop. Otherwise go straight on.
otherwise: ei !  . if(egi, x)], where complement(ei; egi)
S = go straight on
 = e3, where e3:go straight(you)
D = if the light is red, stop
Æ = e4, where e4:if(e2, e1), e1:red(light1), e2:stop(you)
ei = er = e1, where e1:red(light1)
R(; ei)  e5:if(egi; e3), where complement(e2; egi)
R(; Æ)  contrast(e5, e4)
15 Because eventuality e2 has both the properties of explaining the cancelling and of being after the
ordering, it follows that what explains the cancelling is something that was after the ordering.
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i.e., if the light is not red, go straight on.
Notice that the above treatment obviates the need for a separate otherwise relation.
Mann and Thompson (1988) describe their proposed otherwise relation as having the
eect:
R [the reader] recognizes the dependency relation of prevention between
the realization of the situation presented in N [the nucleus] and the real-
ization of the situation presented in S [the satellite] (Mann and Thomp-
son, 1988, p.276)
and give as an example:
Anyone desiring to update their entry in this brochure should have their
copy in by Dec. 1. Otherwise the existing entry will be used.
This is similar to Example 50. But given our overall approach, where lexico-syntactic ma-
terial can contribute to both clause-level and discourse-level semantics, it is not diÆcult
to see how resolving \otherwise" and inferring explanation (or having explicit evidence
for it, in the case of Example 50a), is exactly what Mann and Thompson were after. And,
as demonstrated, the above approach accounts for other instances of \otherwise" as well.
Case 3: The relation contributed by the adverbial is parasitic on R. Here we
depart from our straight \discourse adverbial as anaphor" story because it appears that
some adverbials { the clearest cases being \for example" and \for instance" { function
in discourse neither as connectives nor as anaphors. Rather, they appear to derive their
interpretation parasitically on the relation associated with a structural connective or
discourse adverbial or on an inferred relation triggered by adjacency. The way to see this
is to consider intra-clausal use of \for example", where it follows the verb, as in
(52) The collection includes, for example, a piece of hematite.
Interpreting \for example" here involves abstracting the meaning of its matrix structure
with respect to the material to its right, and then making an assertion with respect to
this abstraction. That is, if the logical form (LF) contributed by the matrix clause of
Example 52 is, roughly,
i. include(collection1,hematite1)
then the LF added by \for example" is
ii. example of(hematite1, fX j include(collection1,X)g)
That is, \hematite" is an example of things included in the collection.16 (Since with
appropriate axioms, proposition (ii) implies proposition (i), one might choose to retain
only (ii) and derive (i) when needed. But this is a matter of choice, not a claim about
whether both or only one is the interpretation of (52).)
If we look at the comparable situation in discourse, where \for example" occurs to
the right of an explicit structural connective such as \so" (Example 53a) or \because"
(Example 53b) or a relational anaphor such as \then" (Example 53c), it can also be seen
as abstracting the interpretation of its discourse-level matrix structure, with respect to
the material to its right.
16 The material to the right of \for example" appears able to be any kind of CCG constituent
(Steedman, 1996; Steedman, 2000b), including such strange ones as
John gave, for example, a ower to a policeman.
Here, \a ower to a policeman" would be an example of the set of object-recipient pairs within
John's givings.
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(53) a. John just broke his arm. So, for example, he can't cycle to work now.
b. You shouldn't trust John because, for example, he never returns what he
borrows.
c. Shall we go to the Lincoln Memorial? Then, for example, we can go to the
White House.
In (53a), the interpretation of the discourse-level matrix structure headed by the inter-
pretation of \so" is:
result(,Æ)
where  is the interpretation of \John can't cycle to work now", and Æ is the interpretation
of \John just broke his arm". \For example" then abstracts this matrix interpretation
with respect to the material to its right (i.e., ), thereby contributing:
exemplication(, fX j result(X, Æ)g)
That is, \John can't cycle to work" is an example of the results of \John breaking his
arm". Similarly, what is added by the matrix sentence of (53b) is
explanation(,Æ)
where  is the interpretation of \he never returns what he borrows" and \for example"
adds
exemplication(, fX j explanation(X, Æ)g)
i.e., that this is an example of the reasons for not trusting John. And the proposition
contributed by the resolved discourse adverbial \then" in (53c) is
after(,Æ)
where  is the interpretation of \we can go to the White House", and \for example" adds
exemplication(, fX j after(X, Æ)g)
i.e., that this is an example of the events that follow going to the Lincoln Memorial.
(N.B.We use the relation R=exemplication here, rather than example of used in the
interpretation of (52), because it is what is commonly found in the literature on discourse
relations. We are also being fairly fast and loose regarding tense and modality, in the
interests of making a strong case for the basic scaolding.)
What occurs with structural connectives can also occur with relations added through
adjacency-triggered defeasible inference, as in
(54) You shouldn't trust John. For example, he never returns what he borrows.
explanation(,Æ)
exemplication(, fX j explanation(X, Æ)g)
Here, as in Example 53b, the relation provided by adjacency-triggered inference isR=explanation,
which is then used by \for example".
But what about the many cases where only exemplication seems present, as in
(55) a. In some respects they [hypertext books] are clearly superior to normal books,
for example they have database cross-referencing facilities ordinary volumes
lack. [British National Corpus, CBX 1087]
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b. The shows that top the ratings are soft, for example we make Rupert the
Bear and that gets a 60 per cent share of the kids' audience. [BNC, K5C
909]
There are at least two explanations: One is that \for example" simply provides
direct non-defeasible evidence for exemplication, which is the only relation that holds.
The other explanation follows the same pattern as the examples given above, but with
no further relation than elaboration(,Æ). That is, we understand in (55a) that \having
database cross-referencing facilities" elaborates the respects in which hypertext books are
superior to normal books, while in (55b), we understand that \Rupert the Bear getting
a 60% share of the kids' audience" elaborates the claim that \shows that top the ratings
are soft". This elaboration relation is then abstracted (in response to \for example") to
produce:
exemplication(, fX j elaboration(X, Æ)g)
i.e., that this is one example of many possible elaborations. Because this is more specic
than elaboration and seems to mean the same as exemplication(,Æ), one might assume
that it is the only relation that holds. Given that so many naturally-occuring instances
of \for example" occur with elaboration, it is probably useful to persist with the above
shorthand. But it shouldn't obscure the regular pattern that appears to be the case.
Before going on to Case 4, we should comment on occurences of \for example"
elsewhere in a sentence or clause. Here it may simply contribute propositional meaning
intra-clausally as a parenthetical, illustrating an abstraction introduced by an NP, PP
or clause, rather than being parasitic on another relation, as in:
(56) a. In the case of the managed funds they will be denominated in a leading
currency, for example US dollar, : : : [BNC CBX 1590]
(i.e., US dollar is an example of a leading currency)
b. And Kuhn himself argued that ideas that have been rejected by contemporary
science { that heat, for example, is caused by phlogiston : : : [NY Times on
the Web 21 July 2001, \Coming to Blows over how valid Science really is"]
(i.e., that heat is caused by phlogiston is an example of ideas that have been
rejected by contemporary science)
(In \English" English { in contrast with \American" English, the BNC shows most such
examples to occur with \such as" { i.e., in the construction \such as for example". This
paraphrase does not work with the predicate-abstracting \for example" that is of primary
concern here, such as in Example 52.)
But there are also more subtle cases of clause-medial \for example". Consider Ex-
ample 57.
(57) All the children are ill, so Andrew, for example, can't help out in the shop.
Here, as in Example 53a, \so" explicitly connects the two clauses. But (57) cannot be
paraphrased as
All the children are ill, so for example Andrew can't help out in the shop.
because it describes not just a example consequence of all the children being ill, as would
(58) All the children are ill, so for example one of us has to be at home at times.
but a consequence with respect to an example instance from the set of children.
We suspect here the involvement of Information Structure (Steedman, 2000a): While
the interpretation conveyed by \for example" is parasitic on the adjacency relation (result
in Example 57), its position after the NP in (57) may indicate a contrastive theme with
respect to the previous clause. But more work needs to be done on this to gain a full
understanding of what is going on.
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Case 4: R is a defeasible rule that incorporates R. Earlier (Section 2.2), we noted
that the relation conveyed by certain discourse adverbials { notably, \nevertheless" and
\though" { has the nature of a presupposed (or conventionally implicated) defeasible rule
that fails to hold in the current situation. With discourse adverbials, the antecedent to
the rule derives anaphorically from the previous discourse, while the consequent derives
from the adverbial's matrix clause.
Here we illustrate this possibility with examples in which \nevertheless" occurs in
the main clause of a sentence containing a preposed subordinate clause. Where Case 2
showed R incorporated into an argument of R, this possibility shows an abstraction of
R incorporated into the defeasible rule that manifests R. For example,
(59) While John showers, he nevertheless thinks about chess.
S = he [John] thinks : : :  = e2, where e2:think about(john, chess)
D = John showers Æ = e1, where e1:shower(john)
R: during(e2; e1) R: during(X; e1) > : (X = e2)
Paraphrase: Normally, whatever one does during the time one showers, it is not
thinking about chess.
(60) Even after John has had three glasses of wine, he is nevertheless able to solve
diÆcult algebra problems.
S = he is able to solve : : :  = e2, where e2:solve(john, hard-algebra-problems)
D = John has three glasses : : : Æ = e1, where e1:drink(john,wine)
R: after(e2; e1) R: after(X; e1) > : (X = e2)
Paraphrase: Normally, whatever one is able to do after one has had three glasses
of wine, it is not solving diÆcult algebra problems.
We speculate that the reason such examples sound more natural with the focus particle
\even" applied to the subordinate clause, is that \even" conveys an even greater likelihood
that the defeasible rules holds, so \nevertheless" emphasises its failure to do so.
Summary
We have indicated four ways in which we have found the relation associated with a
discourse adverbial (R, in the case of a relational anaphor, and R, in the case of \for
example") to interact with a relation R triggered by adjacency or conveyed by structural
connectives or, in some cases, by another relational anaphor:
1. R(; ei) is distinct from R(; Æ);
2. R(; ei) serves as the rst argument to R.
3. R contributed by the adverbial is parasitic on R;
4. R is a defeasible rule that incorporates R;
While we do not believe that this is an exhaustive list, and we do not know whether
a discourse adverbial always behaves the same way vis-a-vis other relations, nevertheless
we believe that acknowledging some discourse adverbials to be anaphors (and at least
one to be neither anaphor nor connective) opens such issues up for exploration in ways
they have not been before.
4 Lexicalised Grammar for Discourse Syntax and Semantics
As we noted in the Introduction, we do not believe that the relation between discourse
and semantics is intrinsically dierent from that between a sentence and its semantics
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{ i.e., that both are, at least in part, a projection from the lexicon and syntax. The
alternative { that discourse relates to semantics in a completely dierent way { seems
strange when not only can a clause be part of a discourse, a discourse can be part of a
clause:
(61) Any farmer who has beaten a donkey and gone home regretting it and has then
returned and apologised to the beast, deserves forgiveness.
(62) If they're drunk and they're meant to be on parade and you go to their room
and they're lying in a pool of piss, then you lock them up for a day.
[The Independent, 17 June 1997]
That is, the successive conjuncts within the relative clause of (61) and within the condi-
tional antecedent of (62) exhibit the cohesive and argumentative connections which are
characteristic of the interpretation of discourse.
In the previous section, we showed how the semantics of discourse adverbials could
be resolved within the clause and projected into discourse. Now we take another step
back, to sketch out a coupling between discourse syntax and semantics that is a natural
outgrowth of the coupling between clause-level syntax and semantics.
Because lexicalized grammars such as Lexicalized Tree-Adjoining Grammar (LTAG)
(Joshi, 1987; XTAG-Group, 2001) and Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG) (Steed-
man, 1996; Steedman, 2000b) have been very successful in showing how clause-level syn-
tax and semantics project from the lexicon, LTAG is our grammar of choice here.17 We
have described this work in several conference papers (Webber, Knott, and Joshi, 1999;
Webber et al., 1999a; Webber et al., 1999b), and this has led to the initial version of a
discourse parser (Forbes et al., 2001) in which the same parser that builds trees for indi-
vidual clauses using clause-level LTAG trees, then combines them using discourse-level
LTAG trees. Here we simply outline the grammar, which we call DLTAG (Section 4.1),
and then show how it supports the approach to structural and anaphoric discourse con-
nectives presented earlier (Section 4.2).
4.1 DLTAG and Discourse Syntax
A lexicalized TAG begins with the notion of a lexical anchor, which can have one or more
associated tree structures. For example, the verb likes anchors one tree corresponding to
John likes apples, another corresponding to the topicalized Apples John likes, a third
corresponding to the passive Apples are liked by John, and others as well. That is, there
is a tree for each minimal syntactic construction in which likes can appear, all sharing
the same predicate-argument structure. This syntactic/semantic encapsulation is possible
because of the extended domain of locality of LTAG.
A lexicalized TAG contains two kinds of elementary trees: initial trees that reect
basic functor-argument dependencies and auxiliary trees that introduce recursion and
allow elementary trees to be modied and/or elaborated. Unlike the wide variety of
trees needed at the clause level, we have found that extending a lexicalized TAG to
discourse only requires a few elementary tree structures, possibly because clause-level
syntax exploits structural variation in ways that discourse doesn't.
4.1.1 Initial Trees The grammar has initial trees for three types of construction: (a)
subordinate-main clause constructions; (b) parallel constructions; and (c) what we call
relational coordination. We describe each in turn.
In the large LTAG developed by the XTAG project (XTAG-Group, 2001), subordi-
nate clauses are seen as adjuncts to sentences or verb phrases { i.e., as auxiliary trees {
17 CCG would have been an equally good choice.
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Dc
DcDc
subconj
(a)
Dc
Dc Dcsubconj
(b)
α:subconj_mid α: subconj_pre
Figure 6
Initial trees (a-b) for a subordinate conjunction. Dc stands for \discourse clause", # indicates a
substitution site, while \subconj" stands for the particular subordinate conjunction that
anchors the tree.
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Dc
On the
one hand
On the
other
Dc Dc
α:contrast
Figure 7
An initial tree for parallel constructions. This particular one is for a contrastive construction
anchored by \on the one hand" and \on the other hand".
because they are outside the domain of locality of the verb. From a discourse perspective,
however, it is predicates on clausal arguments (such as coordinate and subordinate con-
junctions) that dene the domain of locality. Thus, at this level, these predicates anchor
initial trees into which clauses substitute as arguments. Figure 6 shows the initial trees
for postposed subordinate clauses (a) and preposed subordinate clauses (b).18 At both
leaves and root is a discourse clause (Dc) { a clause or a structure composed of discourse
clauses.
One reason for taking something to be an initial tree is that its local dependencies
can be stretched long-distance. At the sentence-level, the dependency between apples and
likes in apples John likes is localized in all the trees for likes. This dependency can be
stretched long-distance, as in Apples, Bill thinks John may like. In discourse, as we noted
in Section 1, local dependencies can be stretched long-distance as well { as in
(63) a. Although John is generous, he's hard to nd.
b. Although John is generous { for example, he gives money to anyone who asks
him for it { he's hard to nd.
(64) a. On the one hand, John is generous. On the other hand, he's hard to nd.
b. On the one hand, John is generous. For example, suppose you needed some
money: You'd only have to ask him for it. On the other hand, he's hard to
nd.
Thus our lexicalised discourse grammar also contains initial trees for parallel construc-
tions as in (64) and Figure 7. Like some initial trees in XTAG (XTAG-Group, 2001),
such trees can have a pair of anchors. Since there are dierent ways in which discourse
units can be parallel, we assume a dierent initial tree for contrast (\on the one hand"
: : : \on the other hand" : : : ), disjunction (\either" : : : \or" : : : ), addition (\not only"
: : : \but also" : : : ), and concession (\admittedly" : : : \but" : : : ).
The third construction for which we have an initial tree is for structural connectives
that convey a particular relation between the connected clauses. So, for example, there is
an initial tree associated with \so" conveying result { cf. Figure 8a. Additionally, we posit
initial trees for relational coordination, cases where \and" or \or" convey a particular
relation between conjuncts (disjuncts) besides simple truth-functionality. For example,
both \and" and \or" convey result in
(65) a. Throw another spit ball and you'll regret it.
18 While in an earlier paper (Webber and Joshi, 1998), we discuss reasons for taking the lexical
anchors of the initial trees in Figures 6 and 7 to be feature structures, following the analysis in
(Knott, 1996; Knott and Mellish, 1996), here we just take them to be specic lexical items.
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Dc
DcDc
(b)
and
Dc
DcDc
α:so α:and_conseq
so
(a)
Figure 8
Initial trees for coordinate conjunction. These particular trees are for (a) \so" and (b)
relational coordination on \and" expressing consequence.
Dc
Dc Dc
∗ .
Dc
Dc Dc
∗ and
∗
S
S
then
(a) (b) (c)
β: punct1 β: and
β: then
Figure 9
Auxiliary trees for basic elaboration. These particular trees are anchored by (a) the
punctuation mark \." and (b) \and". The symbol  indicates the foot node of the auxiliary
tree, which has the same label as its root. (c) Auxiliary tree for the discourse adverbial \then".
b. Eat your spinach or you won't get dessert.
while \and' can also convey purpose, as in
(66) Go to the shop and get me a quart of milk.
From a discourse perspective, relational coordination diers from what we are calling
scopal coordination, in that the latter simply conveys that both conjuncts bear the same
relation to the immediately left-adjacent discourse unit, whatever that may be. For ex-
ample, in (67) the relation is explanation and each conjunct is a separate explanation for
not trusting John, while in (68), the relation is result.
(67) You shouldn't trust John. He never returns what he borrows, and he bad-mouths
his associates behind their backs.
(68) a. John won the lottery. So his wife quit her job, and he bought a yacht.
b. John just won the lottery. So he will quit his job, or he will at least stop
working overtime.
In (68a), each conjunct is a separate result of John's winning the lottery, while in (68b),
each disjunct conveys an alternative result of John's good fortune.
We distinguish relational coordination and scopal coordination in the grammar by
having initial trees for the former (Figure 8b) { one for each coordinator with its appro-
priate semantics { and auxiliary trees for the latter (Figure 9b), so that the compositional
rules can treat the two cases distinctly. Note that this means that the lexical ambiguity
of \and" and \or" corresponds to a structural ambiguity with respect to this aspect of
discourse grammar.
4.1.2 Auxiliary Trees The grammar uses auxiliary trees in two ways: (a) for discourse
units that continue a description in some way; and (b) for discourse adverbials. Again
we describe each in turn.
First, auxiliary trees anchored by punctuation (e.g. period, comma, semi-colon, etc.)
(Figure 9a) or by scopal coordination (Figure 9b) are used to provide further description
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β: punct1
β: punct1
0
τ1
3
τ2
* .
T1
T2
T1 T2
.
Figure 10
TAG derivation of Example 69
of a situation or of one or more entities (objects, events, situations, states, etc.) within
the situation19 The additional information is conveyed by the discourse clause that lls
its substitution site. Such auxiliary trees are used in the derivation of simple discourses
such as:
(69) a. John went to the zoo.
b. He took his cell phone with him.
Figure 10 shows the TAG derivation of Example 69. To the left of ! are the ele-
mentary trees to be combined: T1 stands for the LTAG tree for clause 69a, T2 for clause
69b, and  : punct1, for the auxiliary tree. In the derivation, the foot node of  : punct1
is adjoined to the root of T1 and its substitution site lled by T2, resulting in the tree to
the right of !. (A standard way of indicating TAG derivations is shown under !, where
dashed lines indicate adjunction, and solid lines, substitution, with each line labelled by
the address of the argument at which the operation occurs. 1 is the derivation tree for
T1, and 2, the derivation tree for T2.)
The other auxiliary trees used in the lexicalised discourse grammar are those for
discourse adverbials, which are simply auxiliary trees in a sentence-level LTAG (XTAG-
Group, 2001), but with an interpretation that projects up to the discourse level. An
example is shown in Figure 9c. Adjoining such an adverbial to a clausal/sentential struc-
ture contributes to how information conveyed by that structure relates to the previous
discourse.
Obviously, this discourse grammar suers from lexical ambiguity. First, as already
noted, we have dierent trees for \and" (and for \or"), depending on whether it con-
tributes an independent relation (in which case, it anchors an initial tree), or whether
it merely extends the \scope" of the previous clause, so that the same relation holds
with the previous discourse. Secondly, many of the adverbials found in second position
in parallel constructions (e.g., \on the other hand", \at the same time", \nevertheless")
can also serve as simple adverbial discourse connectives on their own. In the rst case,
they will be one of the two anchors of an initial tree (Figure 7), while in the second, they
will anchor a simple auxiliary tree (Figure 9c). These lexical ambiguities correlate with
semantic ambiguity.
4.2 Example Derivations and Interpretations
It should be clear by now that our approach aims to explain discourse semantics in terms
of a product of
 compositional rules on syntactic structure
 anaphor resolution
19 The latter use of an auxiliary tree is related to dominant topic chaining in (Scha and Polanyi, 1988)
and entity chains in (Knott et al., 2001).
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α:because_mid
α:because_mid
31
T2
T1
τ1 τ2because
because
T1 T2
Figure 11
Derivation of Example 70a. The derivation tree is shown below the arrow, and the derived
tree, to its right.
 inference triggered by adjacency
much as clausal semantics can be explained in this way. For the compositional part of se-
mantics in LTAG (in particular, computing interpretations on derivation trees), we follow
Joshi and Vijay-Shanker (1999). Roughly, they compute interpretations on the derivation
tree by a bottom-up procedure. At each level, function-application is used to assemble the
interpretation of the tree from the interpretation of its root node and its subtrees. Where
multiple subtrees have function types, the interpretation procedure is potentially nonde-
terministic: The resulting ambiguities in interpretation may be admitted as genuine, or
they may be eliminated by a lexical specication.
Here we try to show rather informally how this lexicalised discourse grammar and
an interpretation process on its derivations can explain the interpretations of several
examples. To start with, consider the following variants on a familiar example:
(70) a. You shouldn't trust John because he never returns what he borrows.
b. You shouldn't trust John. He never returns what he borrows.
c. You shouldn't trust John because, for example, he never returns what he
borrows.
d. You shouldn't trust John. For example, he never returns what he borrows.
We let T1 stand for the LTAG parse tree for \you shouldn't trust John", 1, its derivation
tree, and interp(T1), the eventuality associated with its interpretation. Similarly, we
let T2 stand for the LTAG parse tree for \he never returns what he borrows", 2, its
derivation tree, and interp(T2), the eventuality associated with its interpretation.
Example 70a involves an initial tree (:because-mid) anchored by \because" (Fig-
ure 11). Its derived tree comes from T1 substituting at the left-hand substitution site of
:because-mid (index 1) and T2 at its right-hand substitution site (index 3). Through a
compositional rules on the resulting derivation tree, we get that the interpretation of T2 is
an explanation for the interpretation of T1 { i.e. explanation(interp(T2),interp(T1)). (A
more precise interpretation would distinguish between the direct and epistemic causality
senses of \because", but the derivation would proceed in the same way.)
In contrast with (70a), Example 70b employs an auxiliary tree (:punct1) anchored
by \." (Figure 12). Its derived tree comes from T2 substituting at the right-hand substitu-
tion site (index 3) of :punct1, and :punct1 adjoining at the root of T1 (index 0). Compo-
sitional interpretation on the resulting derivation tree yields merely that T2 continues the
description of the situation associated with T1 { i.e., elaboration(interp(T2),interp(T1)).
Further inference triggered by adjacency leads to a defeasible conclusion of causality
between them { i.e., explanation(interp(T2),interp(T1)). That is, this conclusion can be
denied without a contradiction { e.g.
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Derivation of Example 70b
α:because_mid β: for-ex
β: for-ex
α:because_mid
∗
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T2 because
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for example
for example
T1
T2
3
0
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Figure 13
Derivation of Example 70c
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Derivation of Example 70d
(71) You shouldn't trust John. He never returns what he borrows. But that's not why
you shouldn't trust him.
Example 70c adds \for example" to (70a), which adds the auxiliary tree :for ex to
the set used in analysing it. :for ex adjoins at the root of T2 (Figure 13). Since the
relation between the interpretations of T1 and T2 is explanation(interp(T2),interp(T1)),
\for example" contributes the interpretation
exemplication(interp(T2), fX j explanation(X,interp(T1)g).
That is, his never returning what he borrows is one instance of a set of explanations.
Example 70d adds \for example" to (70b). As in Example 70b, the adjacency-
triggered relation between the interpretations of T2 and T1 is explanation(interp(T2),interp(T1)).
So \for example" again contributes the interpretation
exemplication(interp(T2), fX j explanation(X,interp(T1)g).
Since we have referred to Example 10 (given here as Example 72) so often in the
earlier parts of the paper, we now give its analysis in DLTAG.
(72) John loves Barolo. So he ordered three cases of the '97. But he had to cancel the
order because then he discovered he was broke.
As shown in Figure 15, this example involves three initial trees (:contrast, :so, :because mid)
for the structural connectives, and one auxiliary tree (:then) for the discourse adverbial
\then", as well as the initial trees for the four individual clauses T1-T4. The interpre-
tation contributed by \then", after its anaphoric argument is resolved to interp(T2)20,
is
4: after(interp(S4), interp(T2)).
The interpretations derived compositionally from the structural connectives are:
1: result(interp(T2), interp(T1))
2: explanation(interp(S4), interp(S3)) or explanation(4, interp(S3))
3: contrast(1,2)
Finally, we should point out that discourses that seem to be close paraphrases of
each other, such as those in Example 73, can (in this approach) get their interpretations
in dierent ways:
(73) a. If John took growth hormones for a year, he'd probably shoot up another
three inches.
20 How this is done is not addressed here.
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Derivation of Example 72
31
Computational Linguistics Volume xx, Number x
b. Suppose John took growth hormones for a year. He'd probably shoot up
another three inches.
Besides the trees corresponding to the individual clauses, (73a) would be analysed using
an initial tree for \if", while (73b) would use an auxiliary tree conveying simply elabora-
tion (i.e., that shooting up another 3" further describes the situation in which John takes
growth hormones). This is justied by the fact that sentences starting with \suppose"
don't have to be followed (and very often are not followed) by any description of the
(possible) consequences of the supposition. Nevertheless, one may want to recognize that
the modal situation underlying the two examples is the same. However, in the current
approach, this is not a fact about the compositional semantics of (73b), but derives from
other processes in discourse interpretation, namely anaphor resolution and defeasible
inference.
5 Conclusion
We hope by now to have convinced the reader of several things, including the benets
of treating various discourse adverbials as anaphors and, more generally, of seeing how
discourse adverbials and structural connectives contribute to discourse semantics, rather
than simply treating them as cues to particular discourse relations. We are clearly not the
rst to have proposed a grammatical treatment of low-level aspects of discourse semantics
(Gardent, 1997; Polanyi and van den Berg, 1996; Scha and Polanyi, 1988; van den Berg,
1996). However, we believe that the key to the problem lies in recognizing discourse
adverbials as anaphors and understanding the parasitic nature of adverbials like \for
example". This enables a degree of simplicity that has not before been possible.
Of course, a few roughly done examples do not make a complete grammar or syntax-
semantics interface, and there is clearly alot more that needs to be done in order to derive
anything practical from this work. Still, we hope that we have convinced the reader of
two main things:
 that one does not have to treat the systematic syntax and semantics of
discourse in any way dierently than clause-level syntax and semantics;
 that anaphora involves categories other than pronouns and denite NPs, and
thereby plays a more signicant role in the computation of discourse semantics.
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